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EXPLICATING STRUCTURAL REALISM IN THE FRAMEWORK 





A form of structural realism affirms that, when our theories change, what is always retained is their 
structural content and that there is structural continuity between our theories, even through radical 
theory change. I first introduce and discuss structural realism, with a focus on structural realism 
and change theory. Then, I will consider some critiques on structural realism. In order to address 
them, I introduce the framework of the so-called structuralist metatheory and allude to the notion 
of reduction, arguing that this notion provides the formal elucidation of the notion structural 
continuity. This aims to get a precise notion of continuity of structure, which is central to structural 
realism and to the understanding of theory change. In this sense, I propose a new way of 
formulating structural realism in an appropriate formal framework, namely, the framework of 
structuralist metatheory.  




Uma forma de realismo estrutural afirma que, quando nossas teorias mudam, o que sempre é retido 
é seu conteúdo estrutural e que há continuidade estrutural entre nossas teorias, mesmo com a 
mudança radical da teoria. Em primeiro lugar, apresento e discuto o realismo estrutural, com foco 
no realismo estrutural e na teoria da mudança. Depois, vou considerar algumas críticas ao realismo 
estrutural. Para abordá-las, introduzo o quadro da chamada metateoria estruturalista e faço alusão à 
noção de redução, argumentando que esta noção fornece a elucidação formal da noção de 
continuidade estrutural. Isto visa obter uma noção precisa de continuidade da estrutura, que é 
central para o realismo estrutural e para a compreensão da mudança teórica. Neste sentido, 
proponho uma nova forma de formular o realismo estrutural num quadro formal apropriado, 
nomeadamente, o quadro da metateoria estruturalista.  
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: realismo estrutural - mudança de teoria - continuidade estrutural - 
metateoria estruturalista - redução 
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During the last decades, there have been several developments concerning a formulation of 
mainly two views within the debate on structural realism, so-called epistemic and ontic 
structural realism. The former affirms that all our knowledge is structural, but we remain 
ignorant with respect to the properties of the entities that are part of these structures.1 Ontic 
structural realism asserts that all that exists is structure. Following this view, objects only 
fill places in structures and do not exist independently at a fundamental level. The 
ontologically basic entities are structures.2   
This work concentrates on a contribution to the development of the epistemic form of 
structural realism. In this work, I examine the central features of Worrall’s (1989) original 
proposal of structural realism from the perspective of structuralist metatheory and argue 
that the former can be formulated in a novel way if we apply notions of the latter. I will 
argue that, by adopting the formal framework of structuralist metatheory,3 there is a way to 
formulate a new formal approach to structural realism, in particular to its epistemic 
formulation of it. 
Since this work mainly concerns the issue of theory change and the persistence of 
structures through such a change, it is the epistemic version of structural realism which is 
addressed. I will further argue that the debate on ontic structural realism can be addressed 
independently of epistemic structural realism, and has its own problems that don't arise for 
epistemic structural realists. 
To address some critiques of structural realism the framework of structuralist 
metatheory provides us with a developed methodology and the adequate formal tools for 
the logical reconstruction of empirical theories. The structuralist concept of reduction will 
play a central role here. In the last years, much has been said about the appropriate 
framework for structural realism. Especially in Landry and Rickles (2012), an abundant 
                                                          
1 This position can be traced back to Poincaré (1905), Russell (1912), Carnap (1928) and Worrall (1989). 
Though the distinction between epistemic and ontic structural realism has been introduced later, Worrall is 
usually seen as an adherent of epistemic structural realism. This might be somehow misleading, since 
Worrall never argues that what we can know is the structure of the world, but what persists through theory 
change, are certain mathematical structures. 
2 See Ladyman (1998) and French and Ladyman (2003) for the detailed outline of ontic structural realism. 
For a more recent and detailed work on this view, see also Ladyman and Ross (2007). 
3 This view is mainly associated with the works of Joseph Sneed (1971) and Wolfgang Stegmüller (1976). A 
detailed exposition of the formal framework of this approach is Balzer, Moulines and Sneed (1987). There is 
no full consensus on the name of this approach. It is often called structuralist program in the philosophy of 
science, or sometimes Sneed-Stegmüller Structuralism, Structuralist Metatheory or Metatheoretical 
Structuralism. I will adopt the name structuralist metatheory here. 
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discussion concerning a framework for structural realism is presented. Other frameworks 
might work as well for this purpose, such as the Partial Structures Approach (henceforth 
PSA),4 but I will explore the possibilities of structuralist metatheory and defend them. I 
think one can be pluralistic up to some point within this context. What is needed is a 
formal framework that serves to explicate structural realism. We need a combination of a 
philosophical vision and such a formal framework, in order to do so. A Ramsey-view alone 
is not sufficient to explain structural continuity in a satisfying way. I will come back to this 
later. With respect to the choice of such a framework, I remain pluralistic, since for the 
purpose of modeling structural continuity, differences are only marginal. Both structuralist 
metatheory and PSA belong to the family of semantic conceptions of theories. 
Many structuralist reconstructions of empirical theories out of different disciplines 
(like physics, chemistry, biology, economics, psychology, linguistics, sociology) have been 
worked out during the past decades.5 A core part of logical reconstructions in the sense of 
structuralist metatheory is to demonstrate precisely which parts of the reconstructed 
theories under issue are connected to other theories, that is, to represent intertheoretical 
relations. I will claim that, whenever there is a structural continuity between two theories, 
structuralist metatheory provides the adequate formal tools to show precisely how such a 
structural continuity looks like, namely, by explaining this continuity applying notions 
from the formal framework of structuralist metatheory (like the notion of reduction, and 
possibly others) to it. However, as I already mentioned above, this does not imply that the 
framework of PSA is not suitable for the same purpose. In this sense, what Worrall 
originally meant by his appeal to the continuity of structure can be formulated in a more 
precise way. In this sense, this work is a programmatic proposal for how to approach 
structural realism within the debate on theory change. It is a proposal for the epistemic 
version of structural realism, concentrated on making precise sense of the notion of 
structural continuity, not restricting to equations or Ramsey-sentences.  
 
1   On epistemic and ontic structural realism 
Worrall’s structural realism is introduced in the context of making use of both worlds, i.e. 
he aims to incorporate both, the No-Miracle-Argument (NMA), which goes back to Smart 
                                                          
4 See Da Costa and French (2003) for a detailed outline of this approach. Also Bueno (1999, 2000, 2008 and 
2009) discuss scientific change within the approach of PSA. 
5 See Diederich, Ibarra and Mormann (1989 and 1994) and Abreu, Lorenzano and Moulines (2013) for an 
overview of structuralist reconstructions 
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(1963, 1979), Putnam (1975) and Boyd (1983), and the Pessimistic-Meta-Induction (PMI), 
which goes back to Laudan (1981), and to offer in consequence a new proposal to scientific 
realism, namely, structural realism. As is well known, NMA can be formulated as follows: 
Our empirical theories are successful. If our empirical theories are successful and our 
empirical theories are false, then it is a miracle that our empirical theories are successful. 
But it is not a miracle that our empirical theories are successful. Therefore, our empirical 
theories are true. PMI, on the other hand, relies on the history of science. Following this 
argument, it is likely that our present theories are false, given the huge amount of theories 
we once held true, and that later on turned out to be false.   
Let us turn the discussion now to the distinction between OSR and ESR. I argue that 
OSR can be criticized independently of ESR. The adherents of OSR argue that at the 
fundamental ontological level, there are no objects, but structures. Probably the main 
objection to this view is that there can be no relations without relata, in other words “one 
cannot intelligibly subscribe to the reality of relations unless one is also committed to the 
fact that some things are related” (CHAKRAVARTTY, 1998, p. 399). So if it is only 
relations that there are, it can’t be without having relata as a necessary constitutive part of 
the relations. However, some adherents of OSR offer the following answer to this problem: 
The best sense that can be made of the idea of a relation without 
relata is the idea of a universal. For example, when we refer to the 
relation referred to by ‘larger than’, it is because we have an 
interest in its formal properties that are independent of the 
contingencies of their instantiation. To say that all that there is are 
relations and no relata, is therefore to follow Plato and say that the 
world of appearances is illusory (LADYMAN & ROSS, 2007, p. 
152). 
 
We can see this answer as an example of how the OSR-debate has shifted away from ESR 
and generated its own problems. To argue like Ladyman and Ross do, is to move away into 
hard metaphysics, which is something entirely different from the focus on epistemic 
structuralism.  
Another critical point is that OSR seems to be heavily grounded on contemporary 
physics. In ESR, what is central is the claim that what we can know is the structure of the 
world, to speak with Poincaré’s famous quote: 
Fresnel’s theory enables us to do today as well as it did before 
Maxwell’s time. The differential equations are always true … they 
express relations, and if the equations remain true, it is because the 
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relations preserve their reality. They teach us now, as they did then, 
that there is such and such a relation between this thing and that; 
only, the something which we then called motion; we now call 
electric current. But these are merely names of the images we 
substituted for the real objects which Nature will hide forever from 
our eyes. (POINCARÉ, 1905, pp. 160-161) 
 
At no point, ESR-adherents claim that at the ontologically fundamental level, there are no 
objects. For an adherent of ESR, I include myself here, it can be perfectly fine to accept 
that at the ontologically fundamental level there exist objects. The crucial point is that we 
can’t know them. What we can know, are the structures which describe the behaviour of 
these objects. These structures can be mathematical equations, scientific theories as a 
whole, Ramsey-sentences, model-theoretic structures, or something else.  
Moreover, if we want to address Worrall’s original proposal and if we want to 
contribute to the debate on scientific/structural realism and theory change, we need to work 
on ESR, since OSR does not have a concrete relation to this. The main questions about 
OSR do not bear with theory change, but with the foundations of physics, causality and the 
metaphysics of science. On the other hand, ESR is about the structure of our scientific 
theories, but OSR is about the structure of the world at its most fundamental ontological 
level. 
In his original work, Worrall bases his position on a case study of optical theory. He 
mentions the theoretical change from Fresnel’s to Maxwell’s theory of optics. He states 
that, though the referents and names of the postulated entities in our theories change, the 
mathematical structure is preserved through theory change. Furthermore, what is 
continuous is the mathematical structure, that is, some equations that reappear in successor 
theories after theoretical change. Differential equations of Fresnel’s theory of the ether 
reappear in Maxwell’s theory of the electromagnetic field. Worrall illustrates this position: 
Although Fresnel was quite wrong about what oscillates, he was, 
from this later point of view, right, not just about the optical 
phenomena, but right also that these phenomena depend on the 
oscillations of something or other at right angles to light. Thus if 
we restrict ourselves to the level of mathematical equations - not 
notice the phenomenal level - there is in fact complete continuity 
between Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories. (WORRALL, 1989, pp. 
118-119) 
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What is asserted by Worrall, is that our empirical theories are not completely overthrown 
when they change, the structural parts are retained. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear on 
this point. Worrall argues that we do not notice the phenomenal level. But if we would not 
notice the phenomenal level, there would be no connection to the empirical anymore, it 
could be a purely mathematical structuralism, dealing with equations that are not attached 
to reality in any form. This is why it is important to note that the phenomenal level does 
also matter for the structural realist. But there can be important changes at this level, and 
still, there can be a structural continuity through theory change, even if the semantic status 
of the referents of the unobservable entities changes radically. It is central that, for the 
structural realist, we do not have epistemic access to the referents of the (unobservable) 
entities that appear in our empirical theories. But we can have knowledge of the 
mathematical structures (equations), in which these entities appear. If it occurs that the 
same equations are part of radically different theories, for the structural realist it seems 
reasonable to assume that what represents the world as best possible are these equations.  
But equations should not be necessary for structural realism to work. Many mature 
scientific disciplines make no use of equations, or only very little (e.g. Linguistics, 
Biology, Social Sciences). Disciplines which deal more with qualitative concepts and are 
less mathematized need also be reconstructable from a structural realist perspective6. If this 
can’t be done, structural realism cannot be taken as a serious position, unless one wants to 
be a strong reductionist about physics.  
What we know in the discussion on structural realism, is that certain structures are 
preserved through theoretical change – see Worrall’s case-study (1989) –, and that other 
parts of our theories get lost. Now, the underlying epistemologically fundamental idea 
behind this whole approach can be made explicit as follows: If only structure is preserved, 
and if we aim to be scientific/structural realists, only the structures can bear the connection 
to the world. 
Since it is the structures that appear again and again through theoretical change, only 
these can transmit the real part of our theories. This just follows if we accept that all other 
parts of our theories (like the terms to which we refer with our theories) get lost through 
                                                          
6 Biology, Linguistics, Economics and the other social sciences do use equations that describe statistical 
regressions. New theories in these fields need to recover these equations for well confirmed parts of old 
theories, just as physics does. And this is so even if one is not a strong reductionist since the statistics relate 
to higher level laws. 
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time. So, the epistemic structural realist concludes: our best epistemological access to our 
theories is through its structures.  
For Worrall, structural realism is defensible, for having shown that at least in the 
case of theory change from Fresnel’s to Maxwell’s theory, certain mathematical structures 
persist. However, this is not enough, since one representative case-study does not convince 
us about the existence of structural continuities in all areas of mature science. For 
epistemic structural realism to get strengthened, it is necessary that further representative 
case studies are carried out. The structural realist will have to find such structural 
continuities in many other cases of theory change. As I will show below, I aim to 
contribute to this by providing a case-study of theory change in linguistics. This will be 
done by the application of the formal framework of structuralist metatheory. 
 
2   Objections to structural realism 
The proposal of structural realism made by Worrall raised several objections. These 
objections have been presented especially by Stathis Psillos.7 I will shortly mention 
Psillos’ objections (and others). The following list summarizes the objections which are 
relevant for my proposal in this work. 
 
2.1   The Standard-Realism Objection 
Psillos argues that the notion of structural continuity can be fully explained by standard 
scientific realism. Mathematical equations have been retained because they form an 
integral part of the approximately true theoretical content of theories. But furthermore, 
there needs to be some theoretical content beyond the equations. Psillos explains this as 
follows: 
If the empirical success of a theory offers any grounds for thinking 
that some parts of a theory have ‘latched on to’ the world, those 
parts cannot be just some (uninterpreted) mathematical equations of 
the theory, but must include some theoretical assertions concerning 
some substantive properties as well as the law-like behaviour of the 
entities and mechanisms posited by the theory … let me just stress 
the main point: if one admits that there is substantive (not just 
formal) retention at the structural-mathematical level, then one 
should admit that some theoretical content, too, gets retained. But 
                                                          
7 See Psillos (2001 and 1999, pp. 146-161). There, he presents several objections to structural realism. My 
aim is only to address some objections, since it would not be possible to address all objections in one single 
paper. 
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such an admission would undercut the claim that predictive success 
vindicates only the mathematical structure of a theory. (PSILLOS, 
1999, p. 148) 
 
And for Psillos, one would end up with the standard scientific realism picture again. As 
soon as one accepts more than pure mathematical structure, he is more than a structural 
realist, Psillos argues. Worrall seems to state that all that is preserved, are the equations. It 
is not so clear in which part of our theories the theoretical content enters. It is a part of our 
equations, but, as Psillos argues, there is also theoretical content that is not part of our 
equations. And if such content is preserved, we would get standard scientific realism again. 
 
2.2   The Uninterpreted-Structures Objection 
That certain structures are retained through theoretical change does not imply that these 
structures (as equations) tell us anything about the structure of the world. It is not clear 
whether these equations represent relations between physical entities which would be 
otherwise unknowable. The descriptions of the world, obtained through our empirical 
theories, cannot be only expressed by equations. Some theoretical assumptions which are 
not part of equations are also required in order to justify the success of an empirical theory. 
In Psillos' words: “… in empirical science we should at least seek more than formal 
structure. Knowing that the world has a certain formal structure (as opposed to natural 
structure) allows no explanation and no prediction of the phenomena” (PSILLOS, 2001, p. 
21).  
One might think in a first step that this sounds very much like the Standard-Realism 
objection. However, the Uninterpreted-Structures objection is different in the following 
sense. One can interpret equations in a merely instrumentalist setting, e.g. one can give 
purely technical explanations on how certain functions look like, but this does not commit 
her to scientific realism, since giving purely technical interpretations to mathematical 
structures does not imply any commitment the scientific realist wants to make. 
 
2.3   The Structure-Nature Objection 
The distinction between structure and nature of an entity, as Worrall proposes, has no 
justification. Following Psillos, scientists normally describe the nature of an entity by 
ascribing certain properties and relations to it. The nomological behavior is then expressed 
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by some equations. There is no need for the distinction between structure and nature of an 
entity, since it is metaphysically inflationary. In Psillos’ words: 
Is the nature of a theoretical entity something distinct from its 
structure? Equivalently, can one usefully conceive of the physical 
content of a mathematical symbol (that is, of the entity or process it 
stands for) as distinct from the totality of the interpreted 
mathematical equations in which it features, (that is, from the 
totality of laws which describe its behaviour)? When scientists talk 
about the nature of an entity, what they normally do – apart from 
positing a causal agent – is to ascribe to this entity a grouping of 
basic properties and relations. They then describe its law-like 
behaviour by means of a set of equations. In other words, they 
endow this causal agent with a certain causal structure, and they 
talk about the way in which this entity is structured. I think that talk 
of ‘nature’ over and above this structural description (physical and 
mathematical) of a causal agent is to hark back to the medieval 
discourse of ‘forms’ and ‘substances’. Such talk has been 
overthrown by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century 
(PSILLOS, 1999, p. 149). 
 
2.4   The Structure-Loss Objection 
Chakravartty (2004), Bueno (2008) and others claim that there are not only cases of 
structural continuity, but also of structural loss through theory change. This objection relies 
on historical facts of theoretical change and is hard to reject at first sight. Bueno rightly 
refers to Laudan (1996), who first discussed such cases of structural-loss, before he says: 
However, structural realism also faces a further difficulty. It arises 
not from the existence of different structures that do the same job, 
but from the existence of structural losses in scientific change. 
There are well-known cases that support the existence of these 
losses. For example, when we moved from Descartes’s celestial 
mechanics to Newton’s, the structure provided by Descartes’s 
theory of vortices was entirely lost. The latter theory explained why 
the planets moved in the direction that they did, and this was an 
issue left unexplained by Newton’s own theory. In other words, 
some structure was lost in this Case. (BUENO, 2008, pp. 223-224) 
 
It is right that in the shift from Descartes’ to Newton’s celestial mechanics, there was a loss 
of structure. Below, we will see how one can counter this objection, or at least turn it into 
the favour of the structural realist that aims to apply structuralist metatheory in the debate 
on structural realism. 
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2.5   An open question 
Not an objection, but an open question in the debate is the following, formulated by Frigg 
and Votsis (2011):  
 
How does the exact relation of correspondence between two structures, the one in the 
abandoned and the one in the successor theory, look like? 
  
In other words, the question Frigg and Votsis ask is about the form of intertheoretical 
relations between the theories in question, and about how such relations between the 
structures of the theories in question looks like in a formal sense. In the Fresnel-Maxwell 
case, how does the formal relation between Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s equations look like, 
since Fresnel’s theory is the abandoned one and Maxwell’s theory is the successor theory. 
It is clear that this question can only be answered by working out careful and detailed case 
studies, where the logical structure of the theories in question is reconstructed. It is exactly 
here where I will argue that structuralist metatheory has the adequate formal tools for 
explicating this open question.  
The matter of correspondence between the two structures is closely connected to 
some of the objections I mentioned. First, if we are able to explicate formally how such a 
correspondence looks like, we can refer to that relation of correspondence as the structure 
that guarantees a continuity between both theories. This structure is not just an 
uninterpreted one, since it will hold between two concrete empirical theories. Second, the 
explication of such a relation will also serve to show how a structural loss is not affecting 
structural realism. For this to work, of course, it is required that the correspondence 
relation between two structures includes all relevant facts of both theories. I will come 
back to the discussion of structural losses when I give my answers to all objections in 
conclusion. 
In the next sections, we will show how these critiques and open questions to 
structural realism can be addressed by applying the framework of structuralist metatheory 
to it. I argue that it will be at least possible to clarify it and to show a clear way of how to 
address structural realism with the focus on theory change and the persistence of structures, 
within the framework of structuralist metatheory. 
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3   Explicating structural realism 
3.1   The Ramsey-sentence and partial structures 
Before I start my explication of structural realism by analyzing it within the framework of 
structuralist metatheory, I want to argue why I see this step as progressive in the debate. 
The main reason for this is that an approach in terms of the Ramsey-sentence does not 
suffice to capture structural continuities adequately. One can represent the structure of an 
empirical theory in terms of a Ramsey-sentence, but it is not nearly as expressive as it 
would be in terms of the semantic conception. The main problem for the Ramsey-view is 
that it is not developed to show the dynamics of theories. It is of course a tenable view if 
we aim to represent the structure of our theories, but for the modeling of theory change, it 
seems to be too limited. Let us quickly recall the Ramsey-sentence: Given an empirical 
theory with theoretical and observational terms: TC(t1, …, tn, o1, …, om), we substitute the 
terms for variables and existentially quantify over them: x1, …, xnTC(x1, …, xn, o1, …, 
om). The Ramsey-sentence, as Worrall and Zahar (2001) argue, gives us a sufficient 
representation of the cognitive content of a theory. However, it is not entirely clear how a 
Ramsey-view representation of our theories in question could provide a representation of 
structural continuity. Nevertheless, Zahar is clear in how such a representation should look 
like: 
Whereas referential continuity demands that as we move from one 
hypothesis to the next, we continue to talk about roughly the same 
objects, structural continuity more reasonably requires that we talk, 
in similar terms, about one thing-in-itself which is not directly 
accessible to us… there ought to be a translation of the old system 
into the new one such that all observational functions and 
predicates remain unchanged, and the old axioms are transformed 
into theorems, or else into limiting cases of theorems of the new 
theory. (ZAHAR, 2001, p. 54) 
 
One could approach the debate better within the framework of the semantic conception of 
theories, as PSA, or with the framework of structuralist metatheory. Especially because of 
the sophisticated development of these frameworks, one can in each case make formally 
explicit, how a structural continuity between two theories looks like. In PSA, this 
explication could be in terms of partial morphisms, holding between the structures that 
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represent the theory in question.8 In PSA, scientific change is represented by partial 
morphisms between structures that represent our theories in question. Let us recall the 
notion of Partial Isomorphism – see Da Costa and French (2003), among others: A partial 
structure is an ordered pair D, Ri i I, where D is a non-empty set and (Ri) iI is a family of 
partial relations defined over D. Partial relations are characterized as triples R1, R2, R3, 
where R1, R2, R3 are mutually disjoint sets, with R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3 = Dn. And R1 is the set of n-
tuples that belong to R. R2 is the set of n-tuples that do not belong to R, and R3 is the set of 
n-tuples for which it is not defined whether they belong or not to R. There is only a partial 
preservation of structure. To model this, the notion of partial isomorphism is developed: 
Let S1 = D, Ri and S2 = D’, R’i be two partial structures, where Ri = R1, R2, R3 and R’i 
= R’1, R’2, R’3 are partial relations. 
 
A partial function f: D → D’ is a partial isomorphism between S1 and S2 if: 
(i) f is bijective 
(ii) for every x and y  D, R1xy ↔ R’1  f (x) f (y) and R2xy ↔ R’2  f (x) f (y). 
 
We can see that with the tools of PSA, we can model scientific change easily. While I can 
see the advantages of PSA over a Ramsey-view, I see it also as a weakness of PSA that its 
adherents do not focus on carrying out detailed reconstructions of cases of theory change. 
Their framework would allow a detailed representation of such cases. In this sense, PSA is 
a promising approach for the purpose of my proposal, but I argue that structuralist 
metatheory serves even better, since there is a focus in case studies about the dynamics of 
our theories. Since structuralist metatheory has also a precise criterion for theoretical 
terms, I see its framework as more appropriate for the purpose of explicating structural 
realism. 
 
3.2   Structuralist metatheory 
Let us now have a look at the framework of structuralist metatheory and how the notion of 
structural continuity can be explicated within this framework. In structuralist metatheory, 
an empirical theory consists of its models, which are sequences of the following form: D1, 
                                                          
8 A proper comparison of both PSA and structuralist metatheory should be the goal of a different paper. In 
the scope of this work, I only want to make clear that both approaches seem to be suitable for making the 
notion of structural continuity explicit. 
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..., Dm, R1, ..., Rn. The Di are so-called basic sets and the Rj are relations constructed on 
these sets. The Di contain what is taken to be the ontology of the theory, i.e. they contain 
the objects assumed by the theory as real. Note that these objects are part of a structure. 
The existence of the entities which are taken to be the elements of the basic domains of our 
structures is merely a posit. It is noteworthy that also in structuralist metatheory, objects do 
only exist within these domains, which are itself a constitutive part of a structure and 
specified by the Rj, which are usually functions. In empirical theories which make use of 
quantitative tools, they usually are functions mapping empirical objects into the real 
numbers, or some other mathematical entities. Structuralist metatheory makes use of set-
theoretic predicates, relying on Suppes (1957) original proposal. 
 
A set-theoretic predicate P specifies the following: 
• The type of a structure D1, ..., Dm, R1, ..., Rn in determining the number k of base 
sets and the number n of relations; 
• The typification of the relations R1, ..., Rn; 
• The axioms that the relations R1, ..., Rn need to satisfy for the structure D1, ..., Dm, 
R1, ..., Rn to be an instance of the set-theoretic concept P. 
 
More specifically, in structuralist metatheory, a theory is understood to consist of the 
following sets of models: A set of potential models (Mp) fixes the general framework, in 
which an actual model of a theory is characterized. All entities that can be subsumed under 
the same conceptual framework of a given theory are members of the sets of the potential 
models of this theory. Let's consider an example of such a potential model, expressed as a 
set-theoretic predicate, which makes the structure of an empirical theory explicit.  
 
The example of a potential model, the potential model Mp of Classical Collision 
Mechanics, see (BALZER; MOULINES & SNEED, 1987, pp. 26-27):  
1. Mp = P, T, ℝ, v, m 
2. P is a finite, non-empty set 
3. T contains exactly two elements 
4. v: P  T → ℝ3 
5. m: P → ℝ+  
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P is a set of discrete bodies (that can be called “particles”), T is a set of instants. v is the 
velocity function, assigning to each particle p and point of time its velocity as an element 
of ℝ3. Velocity is a time-dependent vectorial function whose range are triples of real 
numbers. It assigns a three-component vector (one component for each direction in space) 
to each particle at each time. m is the mass function, assigning to each particle its mass. 
Sets of partial potential models (Mpp) represent the framework for the corroboration 
or refutation of the theory in question, they represent the framework of data, which shall 
corroborate or refute a theory. The concepts in Mpp can be determined independently of T. 
Terms which are theoretical (and proper to T) in the potential models of the respective 
theory are cut out. In other words, this means that partial potential models are the pure 
data-models within the structuralist framework. These sets of models do not contain any 
theoretical terms or functions, no concepts which are introduced properly by a theory.  
Sets of models which do not only belong to the same conceptual framework, but also 
satisfy the laws of the same theory are called the sets of actual models (M) of a theory. 
 
The example of an actual model, (BALZER; MOULINES & SNEED, 1987, p. 27): x 
is an actual model of classical collision mechanics (x  M(CCM)) if and only if there 
exist P, T, ℝ, v, m such that: 
1. x = P, T, ℝ, v, m; 
2. x  Mp(CCM) 
3. ∑  𝑚 (𝑝). 𝑣(𝑝, 𝑡1)𝑝∈𝑃  = ∑  𝑚 (𝑝). 𝑣(𝑝, 𝑡2)𝑝∈𝑃 : 
 
In the actual model of CCM, the fundamental law of this theory is added, the law of 
conservation of momentum, expressing that the sum of the products of mass and velocity 
of each particle must remain the same before and after a collision. Furthermore, it is a fact 
that local applications of a scientific theory may overlap in space and time. For this 
purpose, the formal notion of global constraint is introduced. The sets of global constraints 
(GC) are formal requirements that restrict the components of a model in dependence of 
other components of other models. Constraints express physical or real connections 
between different applications of a theory, i.e. the inner-theoretical relations. To explain it 
intuitively, think of a physical object that is part of a system. This object, say, a certain 
E x p l i c a t i n g  S t r u c t u r a l  R e a l i s m  | 152 
 
Perspectivas - Revista do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UFT - n. 2 - 2018 
 
 
train waggon, must have the same weight, no matter to which physical system that waggon 
belongs. It may stand on a railroad somewhere in Nebraska, or on a railroad close to 
Berlin. The same waggon will have the same weight, if we think of physical systems on 
earth. This fact cannot be overseen. Because of such overlaps, the notion of constraint is 
required in structuralist metatheory.  
Some empirical theories deal with the same or very similar domains of objects. 
Particles will have the same mass in Classical Collision Mechanics and in Classical 
Particle mechanics. Anyhow, these are different theories. The sets of global links (GL) 
represent the intertheoretical connections between such theories.  
 
1. An empirical theory T consists of its core K and of the intended applications I. K is 
itself a complex structure and consists of sets of potential models Mp, partial 
potential models Mpp, actual models M, global constraints GC and the global links 
GL. 
2. The I are the sets of the intended applications of a theory. These are not formally 
characterized. Their determination depends on pragmatic constraints.  
3. A theory-element is then, formally, the following tuple: T = K, I; where K = Mp, 
Mpp, M, GC, GL. 
 
One central methodological claim of structuralist metatheory is that, after a logical 
reconstruction of some theories under issue, we gain results about their relations to other 
theories. In the intertheoretical relations, it is possible to identify structures that might 
appear in both related theories. The respective potential models (i.e. their general 
frameworks) of different theory-elements can be related through such relations. Such 
intertheoretical relations can count as one version of structural continuity. In the Fresnel-
Maxwell case, the continuity would be that some differential equations appear in both the 
older and in the successor theory. 
What could be said against this proposal is that, from the fact that certain 
intertheoretical (and inner-theoretical) relations can be shown, it does not follow that these 
structures are in any form real. But if these structures persist again and again during radical 
theory change, this tells us that at least that our formal representation of the persisting 
structures reflects the world correctly. The parts of a structure which would persist, would 
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then show that we got at least something of the world right. This cannot be the entities as 
objects, since the referents of the objects of our theories can change radically. 
Of course, the persistence of these structures needs to be linked somehow to the 
empirical level, i.e. the structures need to be empirically grounded. Within the approach of 
structuralist metatheory, this occurs only if one builds such structures up, based on 
concrete empirical theories. This means that the formal structures are always a 
metatheoretical representation of a concrete empirical theory. We will see more concretely 
how this looks like, when we consider an example of structural continuity in the next 
section. 
As it is a general aim of this work to outline the methodological framework of 
structuralist metatheory and to show its relations and its applicability to structural realism, 
it is important to outline that Sneed mentions the relation between scientific realism and 
structuralist metatheory in the following way: 
It is important to understand that, on the structuralist view, 
empirical theories do make straightforward, descriptive, falsifiable 
claims about their subject matter. Structuralism is not just a new 
version of instrumentalism hiding behind a cloud of set-theoretic 
notation. On the other hand, structuralists see the mathematical 
structures associated with a theory to be much more essential 
features of the theory than the claims it makes. The claims may 
change with the historical development of the theory, but the 
mathematical apparatus remains the same. Thus both structuralist 
and realist would agree that empirical science makes descriptive 
claims but disagree about the extent to which empirical scientists, 
speaking professionally, mean what they say. (SNEED, 1983, p. 
351). 
 
Sneed explicitly states that some claims of our theories may change through history, but 
that the mathematical apparatus remains the same. This, I argue, must be seen as closely 
related to the structural realist notion of structural continuity through theoretical change, as 
Worrall claims it. Sneed in fact endorses a structural realist view here. But as mentioned 
above in the case of Worrall (1989), the phenomenal level and its connection to the 
structures that supposedly represent it needs to be included. In fact, what Sneed proposes 
here sounds strongly like structural realism, but it is only tenable if the role of the 
phenomenal level becomes clear.  
In structuralist metatheory, the usual approach is to reconstruct some representative 
empirical theories logically. By doing so, the aim is to provide clarity about the logical 
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structure and the ontological commitments of the reconstructed theory. Reconstructions 
show the logical structure of scientific theories. These are identified with structures in the 
above mentioned formal sense. When doing so, the methods of structuralist metatheory 
contribute to a clarification of structural realism. For they enable us to show what 
structural connections between empirical theories look like logically. 
In this sense, the somehow too restricted or insufficient approach of Worrall, which 
is only about mathematical structure in the sense of equations (in the sense of the Ramsey-
sentence), can be abandoned or, even better, amplified. Despite the fact that structuralist 
metatheory has been formulated principally as a program for outlining the logical structure 
of our empirical theories and to model the dynamics of scientific theories, and that it is 
usually understood as being neutral to debates on scientific realism,9 the acceptance of its 
framework as an instrument for logically reconstructing our empirical theories, combined 
with the epistemological assumption made above, lead to a form of structural realism. The 
structural realist can see herself strengthened in a significant way, once she adopts the 
framework of structuralist metatheory. However, one can still be a representative of 
structuralist metatheory without committing herself to structural realism. The step of 
accepting both structural realism and structuralist metatheory requires the acceptance of 
the above mentioned two epistemological assumptions. 
 
3.3   Structural continuity in the structuralist framework 
In order to represent structural continuities between our theories, I propose to make use of 
the structuralist concept of reduction, as it is discussed and defined by Díez and Moulines 
(see 2008, pp. 391-96): 
 
Definition: Let Mp(T), M(T), I(T) respectively be the sets of potential models, actual 
models and intended applications of T. 
Analogously, let Mp(T*), M(T*), I(T*), with respect to T*. T is reducible to T* iff 
there exist the relations ρ and ρe such that: 
1. ρ  Mp(T)  Mp(T*). 
                                                          
9 This has been made clear to me in personal conversation with Wolfgang Balzer and also with Pablo 
Lorenzano, Jose Díez and Ulises Moulines, all being representatives of this view. Although it should be the 
task of a proper investigation whether structuralism can really be a neutralist position. Especially, if one 
thinks of Stegmüller’s notion of the relativized a priori, which seems to incline into a type of structural 
realism. This question will have to be addressed in a different work. 
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2. x, x*(x, x*  ρ  x*  M(T*) → x  M(T)). 
3. y(y  I(T) → y*(y, y*  ρe  y*  r[M(T*)] → y  r[M(T)])). 
 
The first condition establishes that both theories are connected through their conceptual 
frameworks, their sets of potential models. Condition two expresses the derivability of 
laws from the reducing theory T* to the reduced theory T. And condition three expresses 
the preservation of the successful applications of the theories, where ρe is the relation ρ at 
the T-non theoretical level. 
I want to propose that, if two theories are related through the structuralist reduction 
relation, it can be seen as a case of a structural continuity. This criterion of structural 
continuity is of course not a necessary one, but sufficient. It would be absurd to claim that 
all cases of structural continuity should be cases of theory-reduction. As examples of 
reduction in the structuralist framework, one can consider the cases of the reduction of 
Classical Collision Mechanics to Classical Particle Mechanics, and the reduction of Rigid 
Body Mechanics to Classical Particle Mechanics shown in Balzer, Moulines and Sneed 
(see 1987, pp. 255-84). 
 
3.4   An example of structural continuity - theory change in linguistics 
As an example of structural continuity, I will discuss a case of reduction in linguistics. The 
relation of reduction between theories will be taken as an exemplar case of structural 
continuity. This continuity is expressed in the reduction relation as defined in the 
framework of structuralist metatheory. 
Before the development of transformational grammar in the late nineteen-fifties of 
the twentieth century by Zellig Harris and later Noam Chomsky, structural linguistics was 
the paradigm. One main figure in structural linguistics, in its mature form, was Leonard 
Bloomfield.10 If structural realism wants to be explicated, it is only by carrying out case 
studies of all fields of mature science, how the question of structural continuity can be 
definitely answered. The case of linguistics is important for this purpose, since linguistics 
has become a mature science at least since the Chomskyan revolution, where a first 
                                                          
10 Structural linguistics has its roots in Europe and is normally traced back to Ferdinand de Saussure, as its 
main developer, amongst many others. However, for the development of transformational grammar, 
Bloomfield’s structural linguistics is more relevant, since Bloomfield was the main figure of linguistics in 
America in the first half of the twentieth century. 
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important step towards mathematization was provided and a significant step concerning the 
explanatory power of linguistics could be made. This holds especially for the linguistic 
discipline of syntax. 
Since Zellig Harris was the predecessor and teacher of Chomsky and the pioneer of 
transformational grammar, it becomes a natural question for the philosophy of science to 
ask whether there has been a structural continuity through this apparently revolutionary 
phase of theoretical change, namely, the phase of change from the paradigm of structural 
linguistics to transformational grammar, and shortly after to generative transformational 
grammar. Bloomfield already mentioned what was systematized later by Harris: That 
certain morpheme-classes correctly combined build up a grammatical sentence. In his 
words: “Each position in a construction can be filled only by certain forms” 
(BLOOMFIELD, 1926, p. 158). We can think of the example: The tree is old. as opposed 
to The _ is old. In the empty slot, only certain classes of morphemes (or forms) can occur. 
In this case, certain noun-classes. Bloomfield is also clear on the notion of substitution: 
A substitute is a linguistic form or grammatical feature which, 
under certain conventional circumstances, replaces any one of a 
class of linguistic forms … thus, in English, the substitute ‘I’ 
replaces any singular-number substantive expression, provided that 
this substantive expression denotes the speaker of the utterance in 
which the substitute is used … the substitute replaces only forms of 
a certain class, which we may call the domain of the substitute; 
thus, the domain of the substitute ‘I’ is the English form-class of 
substantive expressions. (BLOOMFIELD, 1933, p. 247) 
 
Harris wanted to go further than Bloomfield and searched for a systematization of 
sentence-types. By doing so, he developed a method that enabled linguists to describe how 
sentences are built and changed, like from active to passive. These changes he called 
transformations. He introduced a formalism to label different types of phrases: noun 
phrases (N), verbal phrases (V), prepositional phrases (P), the transformation arrow (↔), 
etc. His notion of kernel sentence becomes central for this enterprise: “The kernel is the set 
of elementary sentences and combiners, such that all sentences of the language are 
obtained from one or more kernel sentences (with combiners) by means of one or more 
transformations” (HARRIS, 1957, p. 335).   
We can think of an elementary sentence as follows: John saw Jill. Furthermore, 
Harris states “Our picture of a language, then, includes a finite number of actual kernel 
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sentences, all cast in a small number of sentence structures built out of a few morpheme 
classes by means of a few constructional rules; a set of combining and introducing 
elements; and a set of elementary transformations” (HARRIS, 1957, p. 339). Following 
Harris, sentences like: John saw Jill, The cat sits on the mat, The tree is old, etc. are 
examples of such kernel sentences. To see a transformation as introduced by Harris, we 
can think of the following example: 
 
• The kernel sentence: John saw Jill, in active is obtained from the passive 
 
Jill was seen by John, through a transformation. 
 
Harris’ formalism in this case: N1 V N2 ↔ N2 V* N1. 
 
For Harris, morphemes could be grouped into classes (e.g. the class of sufixmorphemes, 
e.g. -hood, etc.). The members of a class have similar sets of co-occurrents (here: 
neighbour-, false-, likeli-, etc. Each class occurs with specific other classes to make a 
sentence structure. Furthermore, certain sequences of classes could build up sentences. 
These sequences are products of a small number of elementary class sequences 
(constructions) which are combined in certain ways. As here: TNPNV (= The risk of crisis 
vanished) results from the more elementary class sequences TNV and NPN. 
The notion of form is central for Bloomfield: “The vocal features common to same 
or partly same utterances are forms; the corresponding stimulus-reaction features are 
meanings. Thus a form is a recurrent vocal feature which has meaning, and a meaning is a 
recurrent stimulus-reaction feature which corresponds to a form” (BLOOMFIELD, 1926, 
p. 155). Forms are non-observational, as opposed to utterances, with which the empirical 
linguist is acquainted when she actually works descriptively. The components of words, in 
their minimal occurrence, the morphemes, are forms. Following Bloomfield, a form is then 
any vocal feature which frequently is uttered and which is at least partially alike to further 
utterances. I introduce the set 𝔉 of forms. 
I will quickly introduce both the potential models of Bloomfield’s and of Harris 
theories of syntax. I restrict here to syntax because there, structural continuity is most 
eminent. The study of the complete logical structure of both theories is far more complex 
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and requires an investigation on its own, and can not be part of this work. For the purpose 
of this work, it is sufficient to outline that both theories are related through the structuralist 
reduction-relation, concerning the linguistic sub-discipline of syntax. 
 
The model M of Bloomfield’s syntax TBS: 
1. M = 𝔉, concat, ⊏. 
2. 𝔉 is a finite, non-empty set. 
3. concat: 𝔉 ∞  𝔉 ∞ → 𝔉 ∞. 
4. ⊏  𝔉 ∞  𝔉 ∞. 
5. x (x is a form) → y (y is a form and y can be concatenated with x). 
 
Basic intended interpretation: 𝔉 is a set of linguistic forms. The more specific linguistic 
entities such as morphemes, words, phrases or sentences, are all linguistic forms. Hence, 
only forms are required in the ontology of the theory. Several linguistic forms can be 
concatenated. We introduce the function concat: 𝔉 ∞  𝔉 ∞ → 𝔉 ∞. This is the 
concatenation function on forms, where (𝔉 ∞ = { f1, …, fn | fi  𝔉, n ≥ 1}). We want to 
express that two or more linguistic forms can be combined in order to build bigger 
linguistic forms. Morphemes, for instance, are connected and construct bigger forms like 
words. These then can be connected to build up bigger forms, like phrases. Hence, we 
introduce an ordering relation on the set of linguistic forms. We call this the parthood 
relation for forms. It is a reflexive, antisymmetrical and transitive relation. As an example, 
we can think of the word ‘unspeakable’ which we can decompose into the three 
morphemes ‘un’, ‘speak’ and ‘able’. By concatenating these three morphemes, the word 
‘unspeakable’ is built. 
 
The model M of Harris’ syntax THS: 
1. M = 𝔉, concat, ⊏, trans. 
2. 𝔉 is a finite, non-empty set. 
3. concat: 𝔉 ∞  𝔉 ∞ → 𝔉 ∞. 
4. ⊏  𝔉 ∞  𝔉 ∞. 
5. trans: 𝔉 → 𝔉. 
6. x (x is a form) → y (y is a form and y can be concatenated with x). 
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7. x (x is a form) → y (y is the transform of x). 
 
The potential model of Harris' theory states the same as the model of Bloomfield, but 
expresses one more crucial fact, the fact that linguistic forms do always have a transform. 
The function trans expresses that forms are always transformed to other forms. This aims 
to adequately represent cases like the active-passive transformation, where an active 
sentence like John saw Jill, in active is obtained from the passive Jill was seen by John, 
through a transformation. 
Now, structural continuity between TBS and THS is expressed through the reduction 
of TBS to THS, in the following reduction relation ρ: 
 
1. ρ  M(THS)  M(TBS), x*, x  ρ, iff: 
2. x* = 𝔉, concat, ⊏, trans  M(THS) 
3. x = 𝔉’, concat’, ⊏’  M(TBS) 
4. 𝔉 = 𝔉’, concat = concat’, ⊏ = ⊏’ 
5. x (x is a form) → y (y is a form and y can be concatenated with x). 
6. x (x is a form) → y (y is the transform of x). 
 
Condition one states that the models of both theories are related through the reduction 
relation ρ, where in condition two and three, x* and x are one set of the actual model. In 
four, it is expressed that the entities of both theories are identical, both theories deal with 
the same entities, namely, linguistic forms and their combination. Condition five expresses 
the syntactic law of both theories, that every form can be concatenated with another form. 
The new law, which makes THS the reducing theory over TBS, is expressed in condition 6, 
where it is stated that every form has a transform, such as the example sentence John saw 
Jill. We have seen that in our case-study, Bloomfield’s theory is reduced to Harris’ theory. 
But the important fact for structural realism is that, the structure of Bloomfield’s theory is 
completely overtaken and continuous with the structure of Harris’ theory. It is just that 
Harris’ theory is more complex, it has one law that is not part of Bloomfield’s theory, but 
all other parts of the structure of TBS are continuous with THS. It is a structural continuity 
for the following reason. Both theories are represented as structures themselves. Now, the 
reduction relation provides the continuity of structure. 
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Structuralist metatheory provides tools for a clarification of the notion of structural 
continuity. Empirical theories are taken to be structural entities themselves (in the formal 
sense explained above). Some information about intertheoretical relations (called links) or 
reductions might be trivial and not really informative. Anyhow, I argue, the structuralist 
framework provides formal notions for capturing all kinds of structural continuities, trivial 
and non-trivial. 
When Worrall mentions the continuous appearance of certain equations in different 
theories, structuralist metatheory provides us with a far more universal and abstract notion 
of structural continuity of more sophisticated and detailed formal explanatory power. The 
notion of structural continuity, in this case, has the form as in the definition of the 
reduction above. But in each particular reconstruction of an empirical theory, a theory-net 
will have a certain structure. In this sense, when a theory has reached sufficient 
development and sophistication, it is possible to identify a structural continuity of some 
form. The important question is whether there is a relation of structural continuity which 
provides us with any important information concerning questions on theory change and 
structural realism. In the case of Bloomfield and Harris, it is the structure of their theories 
of syntax, that is preserved. As I have showed in the reduction relation above, Harris’ 
theory adds more features to the theory, but all structures in Bloomfield are continuous 
with those in Harris. 
The mentioning of the structuralist concept of reduction in this work should be 
understood as a simple illustrative example in order to promote the idea of approaching 
structural realism by applying the framework of structuralist metatheory to it. It is clear 
that the whole framework of structuralist metatheory offers a whole series of more 
complex and generally richer concepts which all might be perfectly well applicable to 
address the structural realist concern for structural continuity.11 
 
4   Responses to the objections on structural realism 
Finally, I want to propose the following answers to the above mentioned objections to 
structural realism. First, I argue that the Standard-Realism Objection is blocked if we 
accept the framework of structuralist metatheory. In the case of the reduction from 
Bloomfield to Harris, there are not even equations that could be part of these theories. This 
                                                          
11 Especially Moulines (2011) introduced the notions of embedding and replacement. Whether these can also 
serve to describe structural continuities on a metatheoretical level is up to future inquiries. 
E x p l i c a t i n g  S t r u c t u r a l  R e a l i s m  | 161 
 
Perspectivas - Revista do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UFT - n. 2 - 2018 
 
 
makes it such an important case, for if structural realism wants to be a tenable position, it 
should be applicable to all domains of empirical science, and not only to physics, or to 
sciences that have equations as a necessary part of them. By equations I mean differential 
equations, as they appear in physics, for instance. But generally, there cannot be a need for 
mathematical equations (in the sense of differential equations) for structural realism to 
make sense.  
What about linguistics, again? I do not think it is necessary to have such equations to 
make sense of structural realism. But of course, the more mathematized a scientific 
discipline becomes, the easier it gets for structural realism to sort out relevant structures 
that can become relevant for the discussion on structural continuity. A tree, as it appears in 
the constituent analysis of syntax-theory is also a mathematical structure, and henceforth it 
enters into the discussion on structural realism. 
My answer to the first objection goes very much along with my answer to the next 
objection. To the Uninterpreted-Structures Objection, I propose that if we approach 
structural realism with the framework of structuralist metatheory, we will not only talk 
about equations as structures, but of the whole empirical theories as structures. We will 
never have the problem of having only uninterpreted structures, if we rely on structuralist 
reconstructions of real empirical theories. In the case of TBS and THS, the structures of 
both theories are not uninterpreted, for they represent real physical entities, namely, 
linguistic forms, and the ways in which they are put together. It is important to mention 
that linguistic forms, as existing physical entities, have to be understood as tokens, just 
analogous to physics. When physicists measure the movement of electrons, they measure 
tokens, but when a theory about electrons is formulated, it is about types. This is the same 
case in linguistics. Within a theory, forms are types, but as entities, measured in a physical 
system (in this case, a natural language), they are tokens. 
The Structure-Nature Objection, I argue, can be answered in a Carnapian way, if we 
think of the Aufbau, where Carnap explains the distinction between structure and nature, 
where he calls it the material: 
Every scientific statement can in principle be so transformed that it 
is only a structural statement. ... For science wants to speak about 
the objective; however, everything that does not belong to the 
structure but to the material, everything that is ostended concretely, 
is in the end subjective ... If we aim, in spite of this, at agreement in 
the names given for the objects constituted on the basis of the 
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experiences, then this cannot occur through reference to the 
completely diverging material but only through the formal 
indicators of the object-structures. (CARNAP, 1928, p. §16.) 
 
From the perspective of structuralist metatheory, our empirical theories describe the 
structure of the material, to speak with Carnap’s words. The tools of structuralist 
metatheory allow to represent all empirical theories as structural entities. Hence, there is a 
well-established distinction between these two levels. It is true that Worrall’s use of 
‘nature’ is somehow misleading, for it gives the debate a problematic and unnecessary 
metaphysical touch. But if we rely on Carnap’s concept ‘the material’, I argue, we don’t 
get that surplus flavor of metaphysical connotation. 
It is well known that Carnap was not a realist, and that he aimed to stay neutral with 
his program, in the Aufbau as well as in his later works. Nevertheless, I see that Carnap’s 
structuralist methodology of the Aufbau can be applied to epistemic structural realism. I 
argue with Carnap that, for the epistemic structural realist, only the structural components 
can be objective, since all other ways of describing our knowledge (e.g. via ostension) will 
end up being subjective, in Carnap’s words. Now, if we put this into the context of 
epistemic structural realism, I want to recall that one of Worrall’s main points in his 1989 
paper is exactly that the terms to which we refer with our theories can change completely, 
and that we therefore should better focus on certain structural than on referential 
continuities. In this sense, I find Carnap’s structuralist methodology helpful in order to 
strengthen epistemic structural realism. And in this way, such a distinction between 
structure and nature does make sense, without being inflationary or metaphysically 
unnecessary.  
To the Structure-Loss Objection I propose the following answer. It is exactly through 
concrete case studies that one can show concrete cases of structure-loss. The same holds 
for the inverse case, i.e. one can also show how a structural continuity looks like. It might 
well be the case that there exist cases of structural loss. But what the adherent of this 
objection is urged to do is to work out careful case studies on these supposed structural 
losses. The same, again, for the structural realist. And it is exactly the aim of this work to 
contribute to this with the case study of linguistics provided here. It can be seen that, with 
the approach I am proposing, the question of structural continuity becomes a matter of 
accumulating convincing case studies. I argue that, once we have a certain amount of case 
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studies, we can at least make an inductive step in the way Laudan (1981) does it with the 
PMI, but hopefully towards the other direction. 
It might well turn out that the result will be that there are more cases of losses than of 
continuities, but this is a question, I argue, which cannot be answered normatively, and 
must be pursued in a way of accumulating logical reconstructions of concrete cases of 
scientific change. The crucial point for the solution of the question of structural losses is 
concerned with the importance of every specific case-study. As the structural realist will 
have to find representative cases of structural continuities, the same holds for those arguing 
in favor of structural losses. Is the case of the continuity of structure from Fresnel’s to 
Maxwell’s theory convincing enough? Surely not. There is a need for more case-studies. 
At the end, both sides will have to argue for the importance of each case in question. 
 
Conclusion 
First, I introduced structural realism by mainly alluding to Worrall's work and distancing 
my position from OSR. I mentioned a series of critiques that had been made to structural 
realism. I argued that an adequate tool for characterizing epistemic structural realism in a 
clear way is by means of structuralist metatheory. By applying certain technical notions of 
this program, the notion of structural continuity can be understood in a broader sense as 
only in the sense of a reappearance of certain mathematical equations. The result helps 
both to clarify Worrall’s original proposal and to amplify structural realism. I argued that 
the structuralist notion of reduction can be used to represent formally what structural 
realists mean by ‘structural continuity’. It is clear that only after taking out further concrete 
case studies, structural realism will find its corroboration or refutation. These case studies 
have to be worked out of all scientific disciplines which provide representative cases of 
theory change. In this sense I have pointed out which way might be a promising one to 
pursue for both structural realists and its opponents in order to bring out clear results 
within the debate.   
It should also be clear that by no means this work does aim to provide ultimate 
answers to all objections that have been raised against structural realism. Moreover, it is a 
specific proposal of how to approach epistemic structural realism with a focus on theory 
change in a new way in order to provide solutions to some of its problems. 
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